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The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of
the Juridical Field
by
PIERRE BOURDIEU

Translator's Introduction

by
RICHARD TERDIMAN*

Pierre Bourdieu holds the Chair in Sociology at the prestigious Collge de France, Paris. He is Directeur d'Etudes at l'Ecole des Hautes
Etudes en Sciences Sociales, where he is also Director of the Center for
European Sociology, and Editor of the influential journal Actes de la
reqherche en sciences soqiales. Professor Bourdieu is the author or coauthor of approximately twenty books. A number of these have been
published in English translation: The Algerians, 1962; Reproduction in
Education, Society and Culture (with Jean-Claude Passeron), 1977; Outline of a Theory of Practice, 1977; Algeria 1960, 1979; The Inheritors:
French Students and their Relations to Culture, 1979; Distinction: A Social Critiqueof the Judgment of Taste, 1984.
The essay below analyzes what Bourdieu terms the "juridical field."
In Bourdieu's conception, a "field" is an area of structured, socially patterned activity or "practice," in this case disciplinarily and professionally
defined. 1 The "field" and its "practices" have special senses in
* Professor of Literature, University of California, Santa Cruz. B.A. 1963, Amherst
College; Ph.D. 1968, Yale University.
I am grateful to John Henry Merryman, Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School,
for his generous assistance with terminological and conceptual issues which arose in connection with this translation.
1. Bourdieu's work has provided a series of analyses of different social fields. See, for
example: HoMo ACADEMICUS, 1984 (on the academic field); Champ du pouvoir, champ intellectuel, et habitus de classe, I SCOLIE 7 (1971) (on the intellectual field); Genise et structure du
champ religieux, 12 REVUE FRANgAISE DE SOCIOLOGIE (1971) (on the religious field); Le
Marchddesbiens symboliques, 22 ANNEE SOCIOLOGIQUE 49 (1973) (on the market in symbolic
goods); L'Invention de la vie d'artiste, ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOgIALES 67

(1975) (on the intersection of literature and power); L'Ontologiepolitiquede Martin Heidegger,
5-6 AcrEs DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOgIALES 109 (1975) (on the intersection of
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Bourdieu's usage. They are broadly inclusive terms referring respectively
to the structure and to the characteristic activities of an entire professional world. If one wanted to understand the "field" metaphorically, its
analogue would be a magnet: like a magnet, a social field exerts a force
upon all those who come within its range. But those who experience
these "pulls" are generally not aware of their source. As is true with
magnetism, the power of a social field is inherently mysterious.
Bourdieu's analysis seeks to explain this invisible but forceful influence of
the field upon patterns of behavior-in this case, behavior in the legal
world.
Bourdieu's examples in this essay come mostly (though not exclusively) from France, but his perspective transcends the specificity of any
individual legal system. He intends his investigation to be a case study of
a larger system, and of a broad series of patterns in the "juridical field" in
general. Not surprisingly, Bourdieu takes the law to be a constitutive
force in modern liberal societies. Thus, many of his perceptions and conclusions concerning how the law functions within such societies apply as
well to the United States as to France.
Bourdieu's essay considers the "world of the law" from several related points of view: the conceptions that professionals working within
the legal world have of their own activity; the mechanisms by which their
conceptions of the law, and those of others within their society, are
formed, sustained, and propagated; and the objective social effects (both
within the field and outside of it) of the professional work of lawyers and
the law.
Bourdieu's central claim is that the juridical field, like any social
field, is organized around a body of internal protocols and assumptions,
characteristic behaviors and self-sustaining values-what we might informally term a "legal culture." The key to understanding it is to accept
that this internal organization, while it is surely not indifferent to the
larger and grander social function of the law, has its own incomplete but
quite settled autonomy. If we take the term "politics" in its broadest
sense, referring to the complex of factors (economic, cultural, linguistic,
and so on) that determine the forms of relation within a given social
totality, there is thus what might be termed an internalpolitics of the
profession, which exercises its own specific and pervasive influence on
every aspect of the law's functioning outside the professional body itself.
philosophy and power); Le Champ scientifique, 2 Acrs DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES
SOgIALEs 88 (1976) (translated as The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progressof Reason, 14 SOCIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION 19 (1975) (on the scientific
field).
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FORCE OF LAW

To experience the "force of law," the quasi-magnetic pull of the
legal field (whether as a legal professional, as a criminal defendant, or as
a civil litigant accepting the jurisdiction of a court for resolution of a
dispute) of course means accepting the rules of legislation, regulation,
and judicial precedent by which legal decisions are ostensibly structured.
But in this essay Bourdieu claims that the specific codes of the juridical
field-the shaping influence of the social, economic, psychological, and
linguistic practices which, while never being explicitly recorded or acknowledged, underlie the law's explicit functioning-have a determining
power that must be considered if we are to comprehend how the law
really functions in society.
According to Bourdieu, such comprehension is possible because the
practices within the legal universe are strongly patterned by tradition,
education, and the daily experience of legal custom and professional usage. They operate as learned yet deep structures of behavior within the
juridical field-as what Bourdieu terms habitus. They are significantly
unlike the practices of any other social universe. And they are specific to
the juridical field; they do not derive in any substantial way from the
practices which structure other social activities or realms. Thus, they
cannot be understood as simple "reflections" of relations in these other
realms. They have a life, and a profound influence, of their own. Central
to that influence is the power to determine in part what and how the law
will decide in any specific instance, case, or conflict.
As Bourdieu points out early in his essay, neither of the two major
strains of theoretical jurisprudence, formalist and instrumentalist, has
any coherent way of talking about the formation or influence of these
pervasive structures that organize the juridical field and thereby influence
2
the decisions of the law.

Bourdieu agrees with instrumentalist theories of jurisprudence to
the extent that he strongly believes the juridical field functions in close
relation with the exercise of power in other social realms and through
other mechanisms. Principal among these are the manifold modalities of
power controlled by the State. But to Bourdieu, the juridical field is not
simply a cat's paw of State power, as instrumentalist theory at times
tends to suggest. Neither is the law just a reflection of these other modal2. Formalisttheories by their nature abstract the functioning of the law from any social
determination, such as that which is exercised by the juridical field as Bourdieu conceives it.
Instrumentalisttheories accept a notion of determinism but attribute it to the power of socially

or economically dominant groups outside the law. Neither strain of jurisprudential speculation thus has any room for attributing such determination to the specific organization and
practices of the legal world itself. That, however, is precisely what Bourdieu claims here.
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ities of state control. On the contrary, the law has its own complex, specific, and often antagonistic relation to the exercise of such power.
In this sense the law exhibits tendencies toward something which
appears like the autonomy formalist theory attributes to the law. But it
does not do so on the same theoretical grounds. In Bourdieu's conception, the law is not by nature and by theoretical definition independent of
other social realms and practices as the formalists claim. Instead, it is
closely tied to these. But the nature of its relation is often one of intense
resistance to the influence of competing forms of social practice or professional conduct, for, as Bourdieu argues, such resistance is what sustains
the self-conception of the professionals within the juridical field. Paradoxically, this manner of what we might term negative connection to the
extra-legal realm is what gives the law the deceptive appearanceof autonomy which formalist theory transforms into a theoretical postulate. The
intricate and problematical forms of relation between the juridical field
and other loci of social power then become a central focus of "The Force
of Law."
In Bourdieu's conception a social field is the site of struggle, of competition for control. (Indeed, the field defines what is to be controlled: it
locates the issues about which dispute is socially meaningful, and thus
those concerning which a victory is desirable.) This struggle for control
leads to a hierarchical system within the field-in the case of the juridical
field, to a structure of differential professional prestige and power attachmng to legal subspecialities, approaches, and so on. This system is never
explicitly acknowledged as such. In fact, such an implicit hierarchy is
often explicitly contrary to the doctrine of professional collegiality and
the theoretical equality of all practicing members of the bar. But this
hierarchical if covert "division of juridical labor" structures the legal
field in ways which Bourdieu's essay endeavors to bring to light. For
example, it pits sole practitioners against members of large firms; or corporate attorneys against attorneys for disadvantaged groups; or, on another level, the partisans of more scholarly approaches against those
favoring more "practical" approaches to resolving particular legal issues.
Much of this structuring and competition happens in the strange
linguistic, symbolic, and hermeneutic 3 world in which the struggle for
authorized or legitimized interpretation of the texts of the legal corpus,
and also the texts of legal practice, takes place. Bourdieu, in common
with many contemporary Continental social theorists, uses an extended
notion of the "text" which may be unfamiliar to many American readers.
3. Referring to the "science of interpretation."
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This conception encompasses not only the written record (in the law, for
example, legislation, judicial decisions, briefs, and commentary), but also
the structured behaviors and customary procedures characteristic of the
field, which have much the same regularity, and are the subjects of much
the same interpretive competitions, as the written texts themselves.
In turn, and crucially in Bourdieu's view, professionals within the
legal field are constantly engaged in a struggle with those outside the field
to gain and sustain acceptance for their conception of the law's relation
to the social whole and of the law's internal organization. Bourdieu
traces in detail the social and particularly the linguistic strategies by
which the inhabitants of the legal universe pursue this effort to impose
their internal norms on broader realms and to establish the legitimacy of
interpretations favorable to the self-conception of the field, to the ratification of its values, and to the internal consistency and outward extension
of its prerogatives and practices.
Bourdieu's emphasis on linguistic and symbolic strategies is worth a
further word here. He bases his view implicitly on a strain within contemporary philosophy known as "speech act theory."'4 Ordinarily we
think of language as describing a fact or a state of affairs. But in the
concept of the "performative" the philosopher J. L. Austin sought to
formalize a special linguistic capacity (one which is particularly inherent
in the law) that makes things true simply by saying them.5 This power is
of course the attribute of judges and judicial decisions, among others.
The texts of the law are thus quintessentially texts which produce
their own effects. Bourdieu devotes particular attention to this special
linguistic and social power of the law "to do things with words." Essential to that capacity-to the law's reproduction and continuation, to its
legitimation in the eyes of those under its jurisdiction-is what Bourdieu
terms the law's "power of form." This power inheres in the law's constitutive tendency to formalize and to codify everything which enters its
field of vision. Bourdieu connects this tendency with Max Weber's speculations about "formal rationality."' 6 He argues that this formalization is
4. See J.AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); J.SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969). Bourdieu by no means accepts
Austin's and Searle's theories without criticism. Particularly, Bourdieu has been at pains to
argue that the force of performative utterances like those considered here is not intrinsic in the
abstract speech situation or in language itself, but derives also from the force of the social
authority whose delegation to a particular individual (a judge, for example) is ultimately sustained by the coercive power of the State.
5. The example typically given is itself quasi-judicial: the monarch's power to ennoble
commoners simply by dubbing them and proclaiming that they are now titled.
6. See M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY I, 86 passim (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds.
1978).
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a crucial element in the ability of the law to obtain and sustain general
social consent, for it is taken (however illogically) as a sign of the law's
impartiality and neutrality, hence of the intrinsic correctness of its determinations. Bourdieu demonstrates the importance of the written formalization of legal texts and the codification of legal procedures to the
maintenance and universalization of the tacit grant of faith in the juridical order, and thus to the stability of the juridical field itself.
Like that of a number of his compatriots whose influence in the
realm of cultural theory and scholarship has also been considerable,
Bourdieu's writing can be perplexing for readers unaccustomed to the
rhetoric of contemporary French research in the "human" (or social)
sciences. But despite frequent charges of abstraction and abstruseness
made against writing in this vein, it is largely its difference from our own
rhetorical habits that can lead to impressions of difficulty.
In the American context, the notion is widespread that research on
a familiar subject (by virtue of the subject's very familiarity) ought to be
easily accessible. But much Continental work in social science challenges
this idea at a fundamental level. It asserts that the mysteries of social
existence are densest, not in the behavior of far-off exotic peoples, but in
our own everyday usages. Here, familiarity has bred an ignorance which
arises not from the strangeness of the object of investigation, but from its
very transparency. Living within it, so thoroughly suffused with its assumptions that it is even hard to recall just when we adopted them, we
tend to lose the critical perspective which makes "social science,' more
than simply a recital of what everyone already knows. The common
sense of things, the knowledge everyone is sure to have, is precisely the
startingpoint for the investigations of such a social science.
If the real meanings of our social practices were what we say and
think about them every day, then there would be no need for the kind of
research that occupies social scientists to begin with. Common sense
rhetoric is an attractive ideal. But many scholars writing in the tradition
Bourdieu exemplifies would argue that such rhetoric can disguise as
many truths as it reveals. For inevitably it reproduces precisely the common assumptions and understandings (what Bourdieu terms the doxa, as
I will discuss below) whose misperceptions and inadequacies any indepth research seeks to uncover. In putting this common sense to the
test by challenging its fundamental assertions and presuppositions, writing like Bourdieu's also tests and challenges plain, "common-sense" writing styles-because they tacitly assume precisely what Bourdieu wants
to call into question: that reader and writer share a comfortable and
unproblematical understanding of the meaning of words, of categories,
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and of social practices themselves, that we already know the truth about
the very things which on the contrary Bourdieu claims need to be
7
brought to light.
For Bourdieu, it is precisely these meanings and categories, these
understandings and mechanisms of understanding, which are under investigation and which need to be rethought most thoroughly. Thus,
while constantly emphasizing the degree to which the law forms and determines the lives not only of its practitioners but of all citizens in modem social systems-so that we are all "inside" the juridical field in some
sense-Bourdieu writes purposely, and purposefully, as an "outsider."
Only by claiming his right to seek critical understanding of precisely
what we are all certain we understand more or less "naturally" about the
law can Bourdieu justify his perspective on these everyday realities which
surround and so deeply influence our existence. This means rediscovering and representing rhetorically the complications, the paradoxes and
contradictions, which our common-sense conceptions complacently
round off and simplify. A certain asperity of writing style is one consequence of such an attempt.
The analysis here brings to bear on the world of the law concepts
developed earlier in Bourdieu's work, and elucidated perhaps most systematically in his 1972 Outline of a Theory of Practice. Among these
concepts are the notions of "habitus," "orthodoxy," "doxa," "symbolic
capital," "principles of division,"
"symbolic violence," and
"miscognition."
From Outline of a Theory of Practice,Bourdieu draws the notion of
habitus: the habitual, patterned ways of understanding, judging, and acting which arise from our particular position as members of one or several
social "fields," and from our particular trajectory in the social structure
(e.g., whether our group is emerging or declining; whether our own position within it is becoming stronger or weaker). The notion asserts that
different conditions of existence-different educational backgrounds, social statuses, professions, and regions-all give rise to forms of habitus
characterized by internal resemblance within the group (indeed, they are
important factors which help it to know itself as a group), and simultaneously by perceptible distinction from the habitus of differing groups. Be7. Of course I am not suggesting that Continental cultural theorists are alone in making
such arguments. Suspicion of the commonsensical is at the heart of much social and cultural
theory. For a refreshing (and strikingly illuminating) example of such suspicion within the
Anglo-American tradition, see M. THOMPSON, RUBBISH THEORY: THE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF VALUE (1979), especially chapter 7, and particularly p. 146.
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yond all the undoubted variations in the behaviors of individuals, habitus
is what gives the groups they compose consistency. It is what tends to
cause the group's practices and its sense of identity to remain stable over
time. It is a strong agent of the group's own self-recognition and selfreproduction.
In the Theory of Practice, Bourdieu defines and distinguishes orthodoxy and doxa. The former is defined as correct, socially legitimized belief which is announced as a requirement to which everyone must
conform. Orthodoxy thus implies some degree of external control. Doxa
on the other hand implies the immediate agreement elicited by that
which appears self-evident, transparently normal. Indeed doxa is a normalcy in which realization of the norm is so complete that the norm
itself, as coercion, simply ceases to exist as such.
Symbolic capital, for Bourdieu, designates the wealth (hence implicitly the productive capacity) which an individual or group has accumulated-not in the form of money or industrial machinery, but in symbolic
form. Authority, knowledge, prestige, reputation, academic degrees,
debts of gratitude owed by those to whom we have given gifts or favors:
all these are forms of symbolic capital. Such symbolic capital can be
readily convertible into the more traditional form of economic capital.
The exchange value of symbolic capital, while it cannot be stated to the
penny, is continuously being estimated and appraised by every individual
possessing or coming into contact with it. The relevance of a notion of
symbolic capital to the study of an important professional field like the
juridical is considerable.
From Distinction Bourdieu draws the notion ofprinciplesof division:
the structured ways different social groups differentiate between rich and
poor, elite and mass, "pure" and "vulgar," "insiders" and "outsiders,"
ultimately between what they value positively and what negatively, between the good and the bad. Division (distribution) of society's rewards
then proceeds along the lines of the principles established.
Symbolic violence implies the imposition of such principles of division, and more generally of any symbolic representations (languages,
conceptualizations, portrayals), on recipients who have little choice
about whether to accept or reject them. In Reproduction, Bourdieu conceives the education function of the State as the quintessential form of
symbolic violence. This is because compulsory eductation and the force
of pedagogical authority obliges students to conceive their own social situation, like the material they study, according to the interpretations of
them inculcated by their schooling. It is not that they must accept these
interpretations (although there are clear costs for not doing so), but that
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even contestation is played out in terms of the assertions implicitly or
explicitly made by the authorities who are charged with teaching. The
term "symbolic violence" is meant to be provocative and is closely
linked with the concept of miscognition.
Miscognition is the term8 by which Bourdieu designates induced
misunderstanding, the process by which power relations come to be perceived not for what they objectively are, but in a form which renders
them legitimate in the eyes of those subject to the power. This induced
misunderstanding is obtained not by conspiratorial, but by structural
means. It implies the inherent advantage of the holders of power
through their capacity to control not only the actions of those they dominate, but also the language through which those subjected comprehend
their domination. Such miscognition is structurally necessary for the reproduction of the social order, which would become intolerably conflicted without it.
It could be argued that such terms and conceptions are no more
difficult to understand, no more counterintuitive, than some of the law's
own central concepts. The point is that some such specialized (and often
apparently hermetic) language is a constant and invariable condition of
the existence of any disciplinary or professional field. Bourdieu's "Force
of Law" represents, exemplifies, and investigates the intersection of two
such fields, the sociological and the juridical. Such an intersection, or
confrontation, cannot evade the terminological and conceptual conflict,
the struggle for conceptual control, which by its very nature is implicit in
the existence of any field. So here, in a sense, sociology pits itself against
the law-not in a spirit of hostility, but in one of intimate critical investigation. It seeks to utilize the privilege of external perspective to illuminate the juridical field in a way that, for perfectly good and
understandable reasons, is hardly visible from within the field itself.
8. In French, the common word mdconnaissance;the term has also been translated as
"misrecognition." Obviously neither of these coinages is fully satisfactory.

